Abstract-Cloud federations are a new collaboration paradigm where organizations share data across their private cloud infrastructures. However, the adoption of cloud federations is hindered by federated organizations' concerns on potential risks of data leakage and data misuse. For cloud federations to be viable, federated organizations' privacy concerns should be alleviated by providing mechanisms that allow organizations to control which users from other federated organizations can access which data. We propose a novel identity and access management system for cloud federations. The system allows federated organizations to enforce attribute-based access control policies on their data in a privacy-preserving fashion. Users are granted access to federated data when their identity attributes match the policies, but without revealing their attributes to the federated organization owning data. The system also guarantees the integrity of the policy evaluation process by using blockchain technology and Intel SGX trusted hardware. It uses blockchain to ensure that users identity attributes and access control policies cannot be modified by a malicious user, while Intel SGX protects the integrity and confidentiality of the policy enforcement process. We present the access control protocol, the system architecture and discuss future extensions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has enabled cross-organizational collaborations called cloud federations. In cloud federations partner organizations share data hosted on their private cloud infrastructures in order to achieve a common business goal. Thereby, the data stored in one cloud infrastructure are available not only to the users of the organization owning the data, but also to users of other organizations that are part of the federation.
However, the realization of federations of private clouds is hindered by partner organizations' privacy concerns sharing its data across private cloud infrastructures.
For cloud federation to become a reality, researchers need to develop an identity and access management framework that allows organizations to authenticate users from other federate organizations and to determine which authenticated users can access which data in federated organizations' cloud infrastructures.
The framework should satisfy several security requirements. First, it should allow federated organizations to specify finegrained access control policies based on data consumers' properties often called identity attributes rather than consumers' role. Second, as identity attributes encode consumer's sensitive information and revealing them to other federated organizations may not be desirable [1] , identity attributes should be kept private. Third, the framework should guarantee the integrity of the policy evaluation process. Indeed, enforcing access control policies in a federated cloud requires an architecture where distributed components participate to the evaluation and enforcement of access control policies. Due to its distributed nature such an architecture is vulnerable to attacks that can compromise the policy evaluation process. A malicious user or software could take control of the host where the policy evaluation engine is running or the access control policies are stored. For example, it could modify the evaluation process to return always the same access control decision e.g permit or modify the access control policies.
Few access control frameworks to support secure data sharing in cloud federations have been recently proposed [2] , [3] , [1] . However the proposed frameworks do no support identity attributes privacy and do not guarantee the integrity of the policy evaluation process.
Contribution. In this paper we present an identity and access management system for secure data sharing in cloud federations. The framework allows federated organizations to specify fine-grained access control policies in terms of users identity attributes. The enforcement of the policies preserves users' identity attributes privacy in that a user does not reveal his identity attributes in clear to the federated organization owning the data nor the organization learns which policy is satisfied by the user. Policies are enforced by means of a cryptographic approach that supports efficient key management: data is encrypted with a symmetric key and user is able to reconstruct the key only if he satisfies the access control policy of the federated organization owning the data. The process extends a previously proposed cryptographic approach to privacy-preserving document broadcast [4] .
In order to guarantee the integrity of the policy evaluation process, the framework adopts two novel technologies: blockchain [5] and Intel's SGX [6] trusted hardware. Blockchain is a distributed ledger of data and computations on these data cannot be modified. The integrity of the data and computations stored on the blockchain is guaranteed by a group of nodes called miners that run a consensus protocol. Therefore, we use the blockchain to store the identity attributes of the users of federated organizations and the access control policies that protect the access to the federated data. However, we cannot use blockchain technology to ensure the integrity of the cryptographic approach to policy enforcement for two main reasons: the approach would be public and it would be too costly to deploy and execute on the blockchain the cryptographic operations on which the approach is based. For this reason, to guarantee the integrity of the policy enforcement process and its efficient execution, we adopt Intel's SGX, which is a trusted execution environment that preserves the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive code and data.
Paper Structure. The next section introduces basic technical background. Section III introduces the identity and access management protocol. Section IV presents the architecture's components. Section V discusses the related work, and Section VI concludes the paper outlining future extensions.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section we provide basic background on the main technologies and cryptographic protocols used by the proposed identity and access management system.
A. Blockchain and Smart Contracts
A blockchain is a tamper-proof public ledger of transactions among nodes in a peer-to-peer network. Unlike traditionally centralized banking system, the blockchain does not relay on any trusted central authority to record the transactions: member nodes in a blockchain network use a consensus protocol to agree on ledger content, and cryptographic hashes and digital signatures to ensure the integrity of transactions.
A new feature supported supported by blockchain networks is the ability to execute programs called smart contracts, which enables a generally programmable infrastructure (i.e. Ethereum) [7] . Smart contracts are deployed and executed on the blockchain network and can be used to reach agreements and solve common problems with minimal trust.
B. Trusted Hardware
Trusted hardware platforms aim at creating secure and isolated software execution environments to protect the integrity, and confidentiality of security-sensitive programs against a variety of software attacks. One of the latest solutions is Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [6] . Intel SGX is a set of extensions to Intel architecture that allows running trusted computations on a remote system. To achieve this, SGX relies on software attestation. Attestations provide users with a proof that a piece of software is running in a secure container, called enclave, hosted by the trusted hardware [8] . The enclave contains only the private data and the code that operates on it. Once instantiated, the enclave is given a credential, also known as report. The report is digitally signed using a hardwareprotected key to produce a proof, also called quote, which can be verified by a remote system [8] .
C. Cryptographic Building Blocks a) Pedersen commitment: Pedersen commitment scheme [9] is a two-phase protocol. The first phase, commit, enables one party Sender S to commit a value to another party Receiver R, in such a way that R does not know which value has been committed, and S cannot change the committed value. The second phase, reveal, includes revealing the original value, whereby R can verify that this is indeed the value to which S has committed.
Pedersen Commitment scheme is based on the discrete logarithm problem and works as follows:
Setup. R chooses large primes p and q such that q divides p−1. Let g be a generator of G q , the order−q subgroup of Z * p . R picks a random secret a from Z q and computes h = g a mod p. R publishes p, q, g, h as system's parameters, while keeping a a secret. Commit. S commits to x ∈ Z q by choosing random r ∈ Z q and sends c = g x h r mod p to R. Reveal. S shows the values x and r to open the commitment, R verifies that c = g x h r mod p.
b) OCBE protocols:
Oblivious Commitment-Based Envelope (OCBE) protocols [10] enable users to deliver information in an oblivious way. The protocol involves three actors: a Sender S, a Receiver R, and a trusted Central Authority CA. S allows R to decrypt a sent information only if its identity attributes committed values satisfy an attribute-based access control policy and without S learning R's attribute values.
The cryptographic building blocks of OCBE protocols are:
1) The Pedersen commitment scheme.
2) Symmetric key encryption algorithm E with key length k-bits. E key [M ] denotes an encrypted plaintext message M with encryption key key under the encryption algorithm E.
3) Cryptographic hash function H : G → {0, 1}
k , where G is a finite cyclic group of large primes. The protocol consists of the following phases:
Setup. CA takes a security parameter t and outputs the public parameters P arams for commit, a set V of possible values, and a set P of predicates. Each predicate in P maps an element in V to either true or false.
Commit. R chooses a value a ∈ V (R's attribute value) and sends it to CA. CA picks a random number r and computes the commitment c =commit P arams (a, r). CA gives c and r to R, and c to S. Initialization. S chooses a message M ∈ {0, 1} * and a predicate P red ∈ P and then reveals P red to R. By the end of this phase, S has P red, c and M , while R has P red, c, a, and r. Interaction. S sends an envelope containing encrypted M to R via an interactive protocol. Open. R extracts the massage M if P red(a) is true; otherwise, R does nothing.
III. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
The framework builds and extends a previous privacypreserving scheme for content dissemination [4] in order to be executed on top of blockchain and Intel SGX. It involves four main entities: O, the federated organization owning the shared data, R, the user requesting access to the shared data, IP, the identity provider who manages the identity of the users in the cloud federation, ACM, the access control manager responsible for encrypting the data and generating the parameters needed to retrieve the decryption key. 
where nym i is a pseudonym for uniquely identifying R in the system, id − tag is the name of the identity attribute, c is a Pedersen commitment for the attribute value v a , α is the digital signature of IP, and β is the digital signature of R. The signed identity tokens IT are stored on the blockchain. Since the blockchain is public, the signature from R prevents that any other data requester uses the identity attributes of R to gain access to data shared within the federation.
d) Identity Token Registration Phase: When a data requester R wants to access a data item D l , he has to register a set of identity tokens with ACM. In particular, he has to register an identity token it, for each attribute condition cond j in the policy acp m ∈ ACP (D l ) where id − tag matches the attribute name in cond j . We denote such set of identity tokens as IT nymi . The identity tokens in IT nymi are not submitted by R to ACM, but retrieved by ACM from the blockchain. Then, for each it ∈ IT nymi , ACM checks if id − tag matches the name of the identity attribute in cond j and verifies both IP's signature α and R's signature β. If both signatures are valid, ACM generates a conditional subscription secret (CSS) r i,j ∈ F q , and starts an OCBE session to deliver CSS to R.
To allow R to retrieve the key K, ACM maintains in a table T all the delivered CSSs for each cond j in ACP D l . Then, the CSSs will be used to retrieve the encryption key K following the GKM scheme proposed in [11] .
e) Data Access:
to retrieve the encrypted data from off-chain storage. Then, R uses the public parameters published on the blockchain (X, z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z N ) and the CSSs to reconstruct the key K as in [11] . Once reconstructed the key K, R decrypts the data.
IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The system architecture consists of several components distributed across the cloud infrastructures of the organizations that are part of the federation (see Fig.1 ). The system architecture is designed with the goal of efficiently storing data and executing code and to preserve the integrity of both. The identity attributes and the access control policies are stored via smart contracts on the blockchain, while encrypted federated data are stored off-chain. The private and computationally intensive cryptographic policy enforcement protocol is also executed off-chain. To preserve the integrity of the policy enforcment protocol, it is implemented by means of Intel SGX-enabled applications [8] . These applications consists of two parts: an untrusted part that starts the SGX enclave and interacts with remote applications and the blockchain, and a trusted part running within the enclave that implements the cryptographic operations used in the protocol. In what follows we will describe the behavior of the main components of the architecture based on a formal abstraction of Intel SGX proposed in [12] . b) Data Requester R: an SGX-enabled application which includes two main sub-components:
• Relay R provides in and out network traffic for Encl R (the program for Relay R is shown in Algo.1), as all SGX enclaves lack networking capabilities. It provides an interface to the users of the federation to requesting the necessary identity tokens ITs from IP, and then registering them with ACM to obtain CSSs.
• Encl R is the the part of code running on SGX enclave (the program for Encl R is shown in Algo.2) which securely uses the CSS to derive the key K and decrypt the data. Encl R has a key pair (pk R , sk R ), which is used for message authentication. sk R is used to produce a digital signature β to sign R's identity tokens. In this section, we review related work which leveraged blockchain technology to enforce access control and works on access control in the cloud. a) Blockchain-based Access Control: The work of Zyskind et al. [13] offers a decentralized privacy solution for personal data that is collected and controlled by a third-party. This model depends on a blockchain, which acts as an access control manager to guarantee transparency over data and retains only pointers (hash) to the data and an off-blockchain Distributed Hashtable (DHT), which can be accessed through the blockchain and stores the encrypted data. When a user signs up to use the service, a new compound identity (user, service) is created and shared. The compound identity consists of signing key-pairs for the user and service, and a symmetric key used to encrypt and decrypt the data. The blockchain 
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verifies the signature for either the user or the service and checks whether the service is granted permission to access the data, then provides the hash to retrieve the data from the off-chain storage. This work is extended by Enigma [14] , a decentralized computational platform based on Multi-party Computation (MPC). Enigma deploys a public blockchain to ensure data correctness and an off-chain distributed hash-table (DHT) to assure data privacy. Unlike [13] , only references to the data is stored in the DHT, while the actual data is divided over several nodes across the network. Thereby, nodes can compute functions together without leaking information to other nodes. The main difference between these approaches and ours is that the process of generating users' identities in our approach is privacy preserving, hence the identity of user requesting or granting access to data is not exposed. Moreover, our access control solution is fine-grained based on users identity attributes. b) Access Control in Multi-Clouds: Many solutions to access control in cloud environments have been proposed. The work of [2] proposed distributed access control architecture for cloud computing. This architecture relies on RBAC model and supports both federated and loosely coupled collaboration models. Suzic et al. [3] provides an XACML-based system for federated cloud environments. Access control policies are enforced in a distributed fashion as all federated organizations, or so called tenants, participate in a common infrastructure that hosts the policy management component. [1] propose a proxy multicloud computing framework supporting dynamic and runtime collaborations between cloud-based services. The role of proxies is to act as mediators between applications not only to offer dynamic collaboration but also to provide resource sharing. In our solution, we propose an access control framework for cloud federations based on users' identity attributes, while using a cryptographic approach to enforce the access control policies.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel identity and access control framework for federated clouds. The framework satisfies several security properties:
• User Privacy. The framework preserves users privacy in that the federated organization owning data learns nothing about the users' identity attributes. The privacy is guaranteed by the use of the OCBE protocol to deliver the CSSs to the user requesting access to the data.
• Fine-Grained Access Control. CSSs necessary to reconstruct the decryption key can only be delivered to a user if he has identity attributes that satisfy the attribute conditions in the access control policy.
• Integrity. The framework preserves the integrity of the identity tokens issued to the users in the cloud federation and the access control policies protecting access to the federated data. The integrity is ensured by storing them on the blockchain via a smart contract. Similarly, the integrity of the cryptographic policy enforcement protocol is guaranteed by running the protocol within the Intel SGX's enclave. We are planning to extend the cryptography-based access control enforcement protocol with an incentive scheme to promote secure data sharing among federated organizations. On one side, the scheme will reward federated organizations for sharing their personal data and will compensate them if their data is misused. On the other side, it will reward those organizations who make a proper use of data once granted access while penalize those who misuse it.
We will also develop a proof-of-concept prototype using Ethereum blockchain and Intel SGX trusted execution environment and conduct an extensive evaluation of the protocol with respect to security, performance, and cost of execution.
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